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REANALYSIS VS. METAPHOR?
WHAT GRAMMATICALISATION CAN TELL US ABOUT
LANGUAGE EVOLUTION
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University of Edinburgh, 40 George Square, Edinburgh, EH8 9LL
stefan@ling.ed.ac.uk / andrew@ling.ed.ac.uk
We argue that studying grammaticalisation is useful to evolutionary linguists, if we abstract
away from linguistic description to the underlying cognitive mechanisms. We set out a unified
approach to grammaticalisation that allows us to identify these mechanisms, and argue that they
could indeed be sufficient for the initial emergence of linguistic signal-meaning associations.
1. Introduction
Language evolution has a notorious data problem: its object of study is simply
too far remote in the pre-historic past for any direct observation to be possible.
In such situations, Ockham’s razor recommends the assumption of the uniformity
of process: that the mechanisms operating in the past are the ones still operating
in the present. This would lead to the assumption that we should be able to learn
something about the evolution of language from the study of language change, and
in particular of semantic change leading to grammaticalisation (Heine & Kuteva,
2002a; Hurford, 2003). Grammaticalisation denotes the (unidirectional) process
by which a discourse strategy, syntactic construction, or word, loses some of its
independence of use and becomes more functional. It is usually accompanied by
phonetic reduction and semantic bleaching and generalisation.
There is disagreement over whether the study of grammaticalisation can give
useful insights into language evolution. Newmeyer (2006), for instance, criticises
the assumption that the unidirectionality of grammaticalisation provides sufficient
evidence that early human language contained only nouns and verbs. We argue
that grammaticalisation is indeed worthy of evolutionary linguists’ study, if one
abstracts away from linguistic descriptions of individual phenomena to underlying
psychological mechanisms. We thus support calls for a more cognition-oriented
study of grammaticalisation (Heine, 1997; Kuteva, 2001; Tomasello, 2003):
Exactly how grammaticalization and syntacticization happen in the
concrete interactions of individual human beings and groups of hu-
man beings, and how these processes might relate to the other pro-
cesses of sociogenesis by means of which human social interaction
ratchets up the complexity of cultural artefacts, requires more psycho-
logically based linguistic research into processes of linguistic com-
munication and language change. (Tomasello, 2003, p. 103)
The remainder of this paper falls into three sections. We first provide a unified
approach to grammaticalisation, allowing us to identify the underlying cognitive
mechanisms. We project these to study the emergence of a non-linguistic code,
before exploring the implications of our approach for evolutionary linguistics.
2. Metaphor vs. reanalysis
Two competing kinds of accounts of grammaticalisation phenomena can be identi-
fied in the literature: those which emphasise metaphorical use (Heine, 1997), and
those which emphasise reanalysis (Hopper & Traugott, 2003). We propose a uni-
fied approach based on an ostensive-inferential model of communication (Sperber
& Wilson, 1995). Such a model emphasises the fact that in a given situation,
a speaker and hearer assume common ground (Clark, 1996). Common ground
includes, among other shared knowledge, the awareness of shared linguistic con-
ventions and the recognition of what is relevant in a given situation, which allows
the hearer to infer what the speaker intends to communicate on the basis of an
ostensive stimulus provided by the speaker.
The grammaticalisation of the English construction be going to, which origi-
nally stood for SPATIAL MOTION, and then came to express INTENTION, as shown
in Example 1, is one of the most cited examples in the grammaticalisation liter-
ature (Heine, Claudi, & Hu¨nnemeyer, 1991; Kuteva, 2001; Hopper & Traugott,
2003), and is also a particular instance of grammaticalisation which is very com-
mon, both historically and cross-linguistically (Heine & Kuteva, 2002b).
(1) a. We are going to Windsor to see the King. (MOTION)
b. We are going to get married in June. (INTENTION, not MOTION)
(examples from Bybee (2003, p.147)).
We illustrate our approach by presenting the underlying psychological mecha-
nisms, for both speaker and hearer, of metaphor- and reanalysis-based accounts of
this change. In the metaphor-based scenario, detailed in Example 2, a speaker
intends to express INTENTION (2a). She uses the form for SPATIAL MOTION
metaphoricallya, assuming that the hearer will realise that (i) spatial motion is
irrelevant in the current context, and (ii) spatial motion often implies intention,
which in turn is relevant (2b–f). The hearer realises that the literal meaning of the
aThere are many reasons for ad-hoc metaphorical use; these could be sociolinguistic (e.g. for
prestige), or the speaker could simply not have a convention for the intended meaning in her code.
signal is irrelevant in the current context, and falls back on INTENTION, which he
associates—and knows the speaker associates—with SPATIAL MOTION (2g–m).
(2) Detail of the metaphor-based scenario.
Speaker:
(a) I want to express INTENTION.
(b) I have a construction which expresses SPATIAL MOTION, and the
hearer shares this convention.
(c) SPATIAL MOTION is associated with INTENTION.
(d) SPATIAL MOTION is not relevant in the given context.
(e) Because we share common ground, the hearer will be aware of
(b)–(d), and realise that I am aware of it too.
(f) Because of (e), I can use the construction for SPATIAL MOTION
metaphorically to convey INTENTION.
Hearer:
(g) The speaker has expressed SPATIAL MOTION.
(h) SPATIAL MOTION is not relevant in the given context.
(i) SPATIAL MOTION often implies INTENTION.
(j) INTENTION would be relevant in the given context.
(k) I must assume that the speaker is co-operative.
(l) I must also assume that the speaker is aware that I know (g)–(k),
and that I know of his being aware of it.
(m) From (g)–(l), I conclude that the speaker intends to convey
INTENTION.
Both speaker and hearer remember that be going to has been used success-
fully to express INTENTION; the more frequently be going to is used in this
sense, the more deeply this new association will become entrenched (Langacker,
1987) in their knowledge. Such entrenchment eventually leads to the phenomenon
of context-absorption, where a pragmatically inferred meaning becomes part of
the lexical item’s conventional, semantic meaning (Croft, 2000; Levinson, 2000;
Kuteva, 2001; Traugott & Dasher, 2005). The entrenched meaning no longer
needs to be inferred from its relevance in the given context, but can be retrieved
instead from the shared conventions which make up part of language users’ ency-
clopaedic knowledge.
In the reanalysis-based scenario, detailed in Example 3, the speaker uses be
going to in its conventional sense to express SPATIAL MOTION—the expression
of which she deems relevant in the given context (3a–e) The hearer, however,
perceives things differently; he does not think that SPATIAL MOTION is relevant in
the present situation but does believe that information about INTENTION would be
(3f). From the hearer’s perspective, this appears to be exactly the same scenario
as the metaphor-based scenario in Example 2. This time, the interlocutors make
different adjustments to their codes: the speaker will further entrench the conven-
tion that maps be going to onto SPATIAL MOTION, whereas the hearer establishes
a new, additional association between be going to and INTENTION.
(3) Detail of the renalysis-based scenario.
Speaker:
(a) I want to express SPATIAL MOTION.
(b) I have a construction for the expression of SPATIAL MOTION in
my linguistic code, and the hearer shares this convention.
(c) SPATIAL MOTION is relevant in the given context.
(d) Because we share common ground, the hearer will be aware of
(b)–(c) and realise that I am aware of it too.
(e) Because of (d), I can use the construction to communicate
SPATIAL MOTION.
Hearer:
(f) performs the same reasoning as in (2g)–(2m) above.
A special case of the reanalysis-based scenario is one where the hearer, in the
role of a language learner, does not have any existing mapping for be going to in
his linguistic code. However, because he can work out from the context that the
speaker intends to express INTENTION, he will create an association between that
meaning and be going to. In contrast to the previous two scenarios, layering (the
co-existence of an old and a new mapping, which yields polysemy) does not arise
in the hearer’s linguistic code in this case.
Two important conclusions can be drawn from our analysis of the metaphor-
and reanalysis-based explanations of the grammaticalisation of be going to. First,
both scenarios are based on the same cognitive processes: (i) those involved in
ostensive-inferential communication—in particular the assumption of common
ground, including knowledge of shared linguistic conventions and the recogni-
tion of what is relevant in the given context; (ii) the automatisation-based process
of entrenchment. Second, the difference between the scenarios is not that only
one of them uses metaphor, but rather that the (infelicitiously named) metaphor-
based scenario relies on common ground having been successfully established
between speaker and hearer, whereas the reanalysis-based scenario describes a
situation where, although common ground is assumed by the interlocutors, there
is actually a mismatch between their respective discourse contexts (Kuteva, 2001).
The metaphor-based scenario is thus speaker-oriented, focusing on the speaker as
the source of linguistic innovation, while the reanalysis-based account is hearer-
oriented. Depending on which of the two perspectives one takes, however, either
scenario can be regarded as a special case of the other.
3. Reconstructible meanings
How can we project these scenarios to language evolution? First, we step back to
see how ostensive-inferential communication works—independent of language.
We note that communication is inherently task-oriented; humans do not commu-
nicate “just so,” but to do something, to achieve a goal or solve a task (Austin,
1962). The task-orientedness of communication entails that once a speaker has
made manifest her intention to communicate, the hearer will have certain expecta-
tions as to what are plausible things to communicate in the given situation. In this
way, a hearer discerns what is relevant from what is irrelevant in a given situation
(as in the scenarios for the grammaticalisation of going to above), and the speaker
can likewise anticipate what the hearer is likely to infer.
In the simplest case, in Fig. 1(a), making manifest one’s communicative in-
tention may suffice for the hearer to be able to infer the information one wants
to communicate. The hearer’s reasoning may go as follows: my conspecific ex-
hibits behaviour that does not make sense unless she intends to communicate;
therefore she intends to communicate something; in the current situation, the only
thing that would make sense for her to communicate is that there is some danger
around; therefore, she is communicating that there is some danger around. Note
that the speaker’s and hearer’s assumptions can be different (i.e. there can be a
contextual mismatch): if the perlocutionary effect does not differ, this may go
unnoticed, and speaker and hearer will map the produced stimulus onto different
utterance meanings. In Fig 1(b), for example, as long as the hearer runs and hides,
it does not matter that the speaker thought she was communicating the presence
of lion, while the hearer assumed that hyena were around.
Of course it is not always possible to reduce the set of plausible utterance
meanings to a single one; in such cases, the hearer needs some assistance in se-
lecting the right one, namely a clue. The hearer’s reasoning might run along the
following lines (see Fig. 1(c)). Because it does not make sense otherwise, I must
interpret the speaker’s behaviour as an attempt to communicate. In this situation,
the only things that would make sense for her to communicate are to tell me that
there is danger and to specify whether this danger is a lion or an eagle. She is
communicating, so there is danger, but how can I decide if it is a lion or an eagle?
The speaker must realise my dilemma, and so her ostensive stimulus will contain
a clue. She is growling: lions growl, eagles don’t (hyenas growl too, but this is
irrelevant as there are no hyenas around at this time of year); therefore, she is
communicating that there is a lion.
The cognitive mechanisms underlying these instances of communication are
identical to those described in section 2 for grammaticalisation. This equivalence
also extends to the entrenchment of the signal-meaning association and thus to the
emergence of a convention. In all cases, the meanings which come to be associ-
ated with signals are those which can be reconstructed from the stimuli in context.
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Figure 1. The reconstruction of meaning in ostensive-inferential communication, where ℘ is the set
of plausible intended perlocutionary effects in a given situation. (a) If only one thing makes sense to
be communicated, e.g. that there is some danger around (A), then the recognition of a conspecific’s
intention to communicate suffices to infer what she attempts to convey. (b) Contextual mismatch: the
speaker means A (e.g. that there is a lion), the hearer infers C (e.g. that there is a hyena). Because
both have the same perlocutionary effect p1 (e.g. climbing a tree), the hearer’s misinterpretation goes
unnoticed and communication does not fail. (c) In situations where more than one thing is plausible,
the speaker must additionally provide a clue. For instance, it might make sense to communicate that
there is a lion (A) or an eagle (B): if there is a lion, one must climb (p1); if there is an eagle, one must
hide (p2). Growling (S) serves as a clue: it is the sound made by lions (S → A)—and by hyenas
(S → C), but this is irrelevant in the given context.
Every speaker innovation can only be propagated through hearer reconstruction;
semantic reconstructibility therefore constrains the types of form-meaning map-
pings which can persist over time (Smith, 2008).
3.1. Burling’s scenario revisited
Burling (2000) makes a case for a scenario of the emergence of linguistic symbols
that is reminiscent of the reanalysis-based explanation of the grammaticalisation
be going to we have given above. He suggests that symbols arise from situations in
which one individual erroneously interprets a conspecific’s behaviour as an osten-
sive stimulus. In our model, this would be represented as an extreme, but never-
theless ordinary, case of contextual mismatch: the hearer interprets the interaction
as communicative but the speaker does not. Because the supposed ostensive stim-
ulus will not have the properties of a proper clue, the hearer will only be able to
infer a plausible meaning if there is only one relevant thing that would make sense
to be communicated in the given context, and if their reaction does not expose the
misunderstanding. Burling concludes that comprehension runs ahead of produc-
tion: “[C]ommunication does not begin when someone makes a sign, but when
someone interprets another’s behaviour as a sign” (Burling, 2000, p.30). This in-
terpretation must be rejected on the basis of our analysis of the psychological un-
derpinnings of the equivalent reanalysis-based scenario of grammaticalisation in
section 2. Although in Burling’s scenario, the hearer does indeed infer something
not implied by the speaker, he does so not on a whim, but under the assumption
that the speaker is inviting him to make those very inferences. Rather than one be-
ing prior to the other, therefore, production and comprehension mirror each other:
whatever a hearer can infer, a speaker can imply. Communication is inherently
co-operative (Grice, 1975; Clark, 1996; Tomasello, 2003), and while Burling’s
“reanalysis-based” account cannot be ruled out, its “metaphor-based” counterpart
is equally possible. Both should be seen as instances of the same set of underlying
cognitive mechanisms: ostensive-inferential communication and entrenchment.
4. Conclusion
We have shown that grammaticalisation can indeed answer questions relevant to
evolutionary linguists, if one moves away from linguistic classification to inves-
tigating its underlying psychological mechanisms. We have argued that the same
cognitive processes that lead to grammaticalisation phenomena could also have
been sufficient for the initial emergence of linguistic signal-meaning associations.
We thus neither endorse nor attempt to disprove Newmeyer (2006)’s specific
criticism of the use of grammaticalisation as a source of information about lan-
guage evolution. Our approach is different from both his approach and the ap-
proaches of those he criticises. We claim that the merit of studying grammatical-
isation, and in fact any semantic change (Traugott & Dasher, 2005), for insights
into language evolution, lies in the underlying cognitive processes it makes visi-
ble, which can be applied to investigate the origins of language.
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